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Introduction   
 
Since its inception, the U.S. legal system has evinced a meaningful commitment to the protection 
of property.1  This work explores why certain property, specifically information technology and 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. Thanks go to the following bright 
and hard-working Washington College of Law students: Irene A. Firippis, Lauren Diane Garry, Nicole 
Irwin, Laura C. Lanso, and Timothy Valley. Thanks also to Dean Claudio Grossman for his 
encouragement and support and to Microsoft, Inc. for assistance with student funding.  
1 Even though the focus of this work, protection of private property from non-governmental parties, lacks 
an explicit home in the Constitution, the idea of protection of private property is central to our concept of 
justice.  See John Locke, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT: AN ESSAY CONCERNING THE TRUE 
ORIGINAL, EXTENT, AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT at 123, in John Locke, TWO TREATISES OF 
GOVERNMENT, at 267, 342 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690).  Locke’s influence on 
the U.S. legal system is hardly controversial – and Locke asserted that protection of private property is the 
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intellectual property (IT and IP), is so difficult to protect when used, stolen, or pirated by a 
foreign entity or individual.  It is not a question of the wrongfulness of IT or IP theft.  Intentional 
misconduct of this type is readily condemned and subject to sanction under U.S. law and the 
laws of most other countries as well.  For those sanctions to work, however, victims of such theft 
must have access to a robust, effective judicial system, and the court or other enforcement 
agency in that system must have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.   
 
The focus of this work is on the difficulty of securing personal jurisdiction (in personam 
jurisdiction) over non-U.S. defendants in U.S. courts.  Given the fact that remedies for IP and IT 
theft are difficult to secure under the legal regimes of many growth markets -- which collectively 
account for the bulk of goods available to U.S. consumers -- unless those who steal IT and IP can 
be brought before a U.S. court or made subject to the authority of a U.S. state or federal agency, 
they will be unaccountable, an unacceptable and all-too-common occurrence with devastating 
social and economic consequences. 
 
I. The Cost of IT and IP Theft 
 
The value of stolen IT and IP is staggering.  A recent White House study suggests the cost is as 
much as a trillion dollars over the last decade.2  Looking just at theft of domestic IP and IT by 
foreign entities, a standard estimate of annual loss is in the neighborhood of $200 billion.3  While 
sources vary regarding actual annual losses, at the low end is an estimate of $58 billion – and $1 
trillion at the upper end. 4  An OECD report tracking losses eight years ago found “international 
                                                                                                                                                             
responsibility of government.  See also Richard A. Epstein, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE 
POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN, 17 (1985) (relying on John Locke and noting that the purpose of the 
Constitution was “the protection of private property [that] Locke considered the purpose of government"); 
Lynda J. Oswald, Property Rights Legislation and the Police Power, 37 AM. BUS. L.J. 527, 535 (2000) 
(explaining that while John Locke urged the preeminence of property, “protection of private property . . . 
[it is not an] absolute in the U.S. legal system”); Cecelia M. Kenyon, Republicanism and Radicalism in 
the American Revolution: An Old-Fashioned Interpretation, 19 WM. & MARY Q. 153, 172 n.13 (1962). 
2 White House, Cyberspace Policy Review: Assuring a Trusted and Resilient Information and 
Communications Infrastructure, 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf at 2 (noting that 
losses in 2008 alone could be as high as $1 trillion). 
3 Neal Asbury, EU Turns Its Back on Intellectual Property Theft, Money News, Jul. 19, 2012, 
http://www.moneynews.com/NealAsbury/EU-Intellectual-Property-Theft/2012/07/19/id/445817, 
(estimating the losses at $200-$250 billion).   
4 Fed. Bureau Of Investigation, Intellectual Property Theft, (Dec. 2012) http://www.fbi.gov/about-
us/investigate/white_collar/ipr/ipr (estimating the cost as “billions of dollars a year” noting that “much of 
the theft takes place overseas . . . .”; Sen. Bob Casey, Report by the U.S, Congress Joint Economic 
Committee, Chairman’s Staff, Senator Bob Casey, Chairman, (Aug. 2012), 
http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=aa0183d4-8ad9-488f-9e38-
7150a3bb62be; Bus. Software Alliance, Eighth Annual BSA/IDC Global Software 2010 Piracy Study, 
(May, 2011) (http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2010/downloads/study_pdf/2010_BSA_Piracy_Study-
Standard.pdf); U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and 
Indigenous Innovation Policies on the U.S. Economy, (May 2011), 
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4226.pdf (losses attributable just to Chinese theft of IT in 2009 
exceeded $48 billion); Int’l Chamber of Commerce, Estimating the Global Economic and Social Impacts 
of Counterfeiting and Piracy, (Feb. 2011) http://www.iccwbo.org/advocacy-codes-and-rules/bascap/, 
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trade in counterfeit and pirated products could have been up to USD 200 billion in 2005. . .”5  A 
2011 International Trade Commission Report found that IT theft in China alone exceeded $48 
billion.6 An International Chamber of Commerce Report found, “the total magnitude of 
counterfeiting and piracy worldwide is estimated to be well over US$600 billion. . . .”7   
 
In the wake of this radical diminution of the value of IT and IP, incentives for creativity, 
invention, innovation, and efficiency falter.  If left unsolved, the problem of IT and IP theft 
threaten established and nascent businesses, large publically traded companies and start-ups – in 
short, the core of the U.S. economy.  The theft of IT and IP not only harms the creators of that IT 
and IP, it also perverts the marketplace, devastating U.S. companies that respect the rule of law 
who are undercut by those selling and using products made with stolen IT or IP.    
 
The notion of a fair and equal treatment, in this instance making foreign entities subject to the 
same rules and sanctions as domestic entities, i.e., a level playing field in the marketplace, is 
deeply embedded in our culture.  Abraham Lincoln famously noted that among the goals and 
purposes of civil government was, “that each of you may have . . .  an open field and a fair 
chance for your industry, enterprise and intelligence. . . .”8  Achieving that “open field” and “fair 
chance” in the IT and IP fields, given the prevalence of theft of that property, will require 
aggressive judicial and regulatory action in state and federal venues.9   
                                                                                                                                                             
(placing the value of losses at $200 billion); Bus. Software Alliance, Eighth Annual BSA Global Software 
Piracy Study, (May 2010) http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2010/;  
Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy, (2007) 
http://www.oecd.org/industry/industryandglobalisation/38707619.pdf, (annual losses from IT and IP theft 
are at least of $200 billion); Stephen E. Siwek, The True Cost of Copyright Industry Piracy to the U.S. 
Economy, INST. FOR POL'Y INNOVATION (Oct. 3, 2007), http://www.ipi.org/ipi_issues/detail/the-
true-cost-of-copyright-industry-piracy-to-the-us-economy.  
5 Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., The Economic Impact of Counterfeiting and Piracy - Executive 
Summary, 4 (2007), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/13/12/38707619.pdf, 
6 U.S. Firms Report Losing Sales, Profits, Royalties, and Brand Reputations Due to IPR Infringement in 
China Says US ITC, USITC (May 18, 2011), 
 http://www.usitc.gov/press_room/news_release/2011/er0518jj2.htm.   
7  Intl’ Chamber of Commerce, In 2004, ICC launched the Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and 
Piracy (BASCAP) to combat product counterfeiting and copyright piracy worldwide, 
http://www.iccwbo.org/advocacy-codes-and-rules/bascap/. 
8 Abraham Lincoln, Speech to the 166th Ohio Regiment on August 22, 1864 
http://www.abrahamlincolnonline.org/lincoln/speeches/ohio.htm. 
9 In addition to questionable protection through the courts, IP and IT owners who have U.S. copyright 
protection cannot assert those rights beyond the borders.  Copyright entitlements do not extend 
extraterritorially, compounding the problem of IT and IP theft outside the U.S. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & 
Sons, 568 U.S.___, ___S.Ct.___, 2013 U.S. LEXIS 2371 (March 19, 2013) (providing no relief to 
copyright holders for foreign “first sales” followed by domestic resale of U.S. copyrighted books); 
Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Communications, 24 F.3d 1088, 1095–98 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 1001 (1994) (copyright laws simply do not apply to infringing acts outside the U.S.); United 
Dictionary Co. v. G. & C. Merriam Co., 208 U. S. 260, 264 (1908) (the “force” of copyright laws do not 
extend outside the territorial United States);  Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publishing, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 
(2d Cir. 1988) (“It is well established that copyright laws generally do not have extraterritorial 
application.”); The Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. O'Reilly, 530 F.2d 1096, 1101 (2d Cir. 1976) 
(“Copyright laws do not have extraterritorial operation.”). 
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Unfortunately, the legal problems associated with those actions, specifically the restrictive and 
complicated rules for in personam jurisdiction – the focus of this paper – stand in the way of just 
and appropriate remedies.  Without legal recourse, IP and IT owners lose almost incalculable 
value, the whole of the U.S market suffers, and, over time, millions of jobs will be lost.10  
 
Given the magnitude of the harm caused by stolen IT and IP and deeply held beliefs regarding 
fairness and equal treatment, one would think U.S. courts would be anxious to protect those 
harmed by overt misconduct.  The U.S. legal system, however, has failed to resolve the in 
personam jurisdiction conundrum and thus has not provided a reliable mechanism to hold 
accountable foreign entities that inflict real and tangible harms on U.S. companies and 
consumers through their theft of IT and IP.  Dean and Professor Wendy Collins Perdue recently 
characterized the law in this area as “splintered” noting that the Supreme Court, rather than 
facilitating access to the courts, has muddled the law, announcing doctrine that is “wrong, or at 
least misleading” hitting a “new low” in terms of providing a remedial roadmap for victims of IP 
and IT theft.11   
 
The limits on jurisdiction of U.S. courts over foreign entities discussed in this paper have 
allowed foreign IT and IP thieves to profit with impunity.  Commenting on the difficulties 
private parties face protecting their interests, Professor John Carey explained that “non-US 
manufacturers who entrust their product to a [domestic] distributor with a goal of serving the 
entire US market will not be subject to personal jurisdiction in every state in which their products 
are sold. There is no doubt that foreign defendants will make vigorous use of that result wherever 
possible. . . .”12  Professor Taylor Simpson-Wood recently noted that foreign producers can 
“insulate themselves from suit in the United States, irrespective of the injury caused [by 
employing] a Pontius Pilate-like washing of the hands via [various] distribution scheme[s].”13  In 
short, if unchecked and undaunted by the threat of any meaningful legal consequences, theft of 
IT and IP will continue and worsen.  
 
II.  Doctrinal Roadblocks to Securing Jurisdiction over Foreign Entities  
 
When a deprivation of property occurs, historic and basic notions of justice require a remedy – 
ubi jus, ibi remedium – where there is a right, there is a remedy.14  How bizarre that such a 
                                                 
10 Intellectual Property Theft: Get Real Facts and Figures - The Research: Facts and Figures Illustrate 
the Extent of Intellectual Property Theft, http://www.ncpc.org/topics/intellectual-property-theft/facts-and-
figures-]   
11 Wendy Perdue Collins, What’s  Sovereignty Got To Do With It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, 
and the Supreme Court, 63 SOUTH CAROLINA L. REV. 729 (2012). 
12 John T. Perry, Introduction: Due Process, Borders, and the Qualities of Sovereignty—Some Thoughts 
on J. Macintyre Machinery v. Nicastro, 16 LEWIS AND CLARK LAW REV. 827 (2012). 
13 Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez!Oyez!Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid 
Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR 
L.REV.113, 156 (2012).  
14 3 William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 23 (Dawsons of Pall Mall 1966) 
(1768) (“[I]t is a general and indisputable rule, that where there is a legal right, there is also a legal 
remedy by suit or action at law, whenever that right is invaded”), quoted in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 
137, 163–66 (1803). 
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fundamental principle falters and sometimes fails entirely when the entity engaged in the 
misconduct is foreign.  
 
At a very basic level, a foreign defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of a U.S. court when there 
are sufficient minimum contacts to connect that entity with the forum state and when the 
proceeding contemplated is fair.  Given the harm caused by stolen IT and IP noted in the prior 
section, regardless of the way one calculates losses, the damage is massive and the contact 
anything but minimum.  However, harm to victims has not been the common measure to 
determine personal jurisdiction. 
 
a. The Roots of In Personam Jurisdiction 
 
For more than a hundred years, the Supreme Court has attempted to provide guidance to lower 
courts on in personam jurisdiction over foreign nationals.15  Two basic requirements emerged.  
First, in light of the non-resident status of the defendant, the legal proceeding contemplated must 
be reasonable and fair in terms of the convenience of the forum, availability of evidence and 
witnesses, and other “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” fundamental to a fair 
trial.16  Second, there must be an adequate relationship or connection between the defendant and 
the state, often framed in terms of the defendant’s contacts with the forum, factored by the 
wisdom of asserting of jurisdiction over foreign entities, the efficiency of intended judicial 
action, and respect for other legal regimes.17    
  
U.S. courts are appropriately cautious when their actions have implications for foreign affairs.18 
Additionally, principals of comity19 and deference to other sovereign states are appropriate.20  
However, the notion that U.S. courts are a hostile forum for domestic victims of misconduct by 
foreign entities is troubling at best.  The unavailability of a forum for an injured plaintiff has 
                                                 
15 Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101 (2010) (noting, 
“[i]n the absence of meaningful principles established by the Supreme Court, the lower courts search for 
the significance of the Supreme Court's caselaw in snippets and phrases taken out of context and then 
used as the basis for the courts' opinions”). 
16 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 
457, 463 (1940)); Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 76–77 (1991). 
17 Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–18 (1984); World-Wide 
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980). 
18 See U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 2 (vesting the power to conduct foreign affairs in the executive); U.S. Const. 
art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (providing residual power to the legislature, but nothing in Article III suggests the 
judiciary has a role to play in foreign affairs). The principles underlying the political question doctrine 
urge caution when cases extend beyond the borders. See e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962) 
(stating that “it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies 
beyond judicial cognizance”); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) (announcing that 
“[t]he conduct of the foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the 
Executive and Legislative  [and] not subject to judicial inquiry or decision”). 
19 Philips Med. Sys. Int'l B.V. v. Bruetman, 8 F.3d 600, 604 (7th Cir. 1993) (defining comity in terms of 
the respect foreign nations owe each other). 
20 Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1, 3–4 (1991). 
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serious consequences,21 and the notion that the “courthouse door is closed” can lead to the 
degradation of clearly articulated rights particularly in the intellectual property field.22 
 
The starting point for discussing in personam jurisdiction is Pennoyer v. Neff.23  Pennoyer 
limited a state’s power to “extend its process beyond” its borders,24 finding that a court cannot 
assert in personam jurisdiction over a foreign entity unless there is a sufficient and meaningful 
relationship with the forum state most easily established by personal service or actual presence.  
In International Shoe v. Washington,25 decided more than a half century later, the Court held that 
states could extend their reach beyond their borders to out-of-state parties so long as there were 
“certain minimum contacts” with the forum state as opposed to the actual presence or service of 
process required in Pennoyer.26  The question after International Shoe, of course, became one 
assessing the fairness of the contemplated proceeding and the nature of the defendants’ contacts, 
both from a quantitative (how much value, money, impact, investment, etc.) and qualitative (of 
what type, legal interest, reliance, benefit from the forum state, etc.) perspective.27   
 
In the wake of International Shoe, two tracks emerged for in personam jurisdiction: general 
jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction.28  If a foreign entity has “substantial, continuous, and 
systematic contacts”29 with the forum state, a court can exercise general jurisdiction over that 
entity.30  A foreign entity with contacts sufficient for general jurisdiction is fully subject to the 
laws of that state, much the same as an entity or individual domiciled in that state.  General 
jurisdiction requires a level of contact with a forum state that approximates physical presence.31  
                                                 
21 Issachar Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 717, 720 (2010) (“[A] legal regime that 
does not guarantee to all individuals that their claims of injustice will be heard sends a message of 
disrespect and reinforces their sense of unworthiness.  As a consequence, the unequal access to justice 
yields a loss of legitimacy for the entire civil justice system and diminishes the acceptability of its 
adjudicative outcomes.”) 
22 Megan M. LaBelle, Patent Litigation, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Public Good 18 GEO. MASON L. 
REV 43, 62 (2010). 
23 95 U.S. 714, 732–38 (1877). 
24 95 U.S. at 722. 
25 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
26 Id. 319. 
27 Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471–72 (1985) (holding that requisite minimum 
contacts are required as a matter of Due Process). 
28 International Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318; Burger King Corp, 471 U.S. at 473 n.15 (1985) (contrasting 
general and specific jurisdiction); Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1998). 
29 Helicopteros Nacionales De Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414–19 (1984); Burger King Corp., 
471 U.S. at 472–73 (1985); Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme, 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 
2006); Mich. Nat'l Bank v. Quality Dinette, Inc., 888 F.2d 462, 466 (6th Cir. 1989).  The requirement of 
substantial, continuous, and systematic contacts is not without criticism. See Meir Feder, Goodyear, 
"Home," and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671 (2012) (arguing 
that the standard is insufficient, and also challenging the validity of “doing business” as a meaningful 
jurisdictional requirement); Harold G. Maier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial 
Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 280 (1991) (challenging the legitimacy of 
general jurisdiction and its conformity with Due Process). 
30 Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415; Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3d 
1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006). 
31 Bancroft and Masters v. Augusta National, 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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Evidence of general jurisdiction would be the maintenance of a business facility, offices, 
licensing, sales agents, advertising or promotion targeting a particular state, solicitation of 
business, or other acts that evince long-term presence.32  
 
If the contacts are less pervasive than required for general jurisdiction, a court may exercise 
specific jurisdiction over a defendant.33  Specific jurisdiction exists when contacts, while not 
substantial, continuous, and systemic, nonetheless reflect a conscious transactional engagement 
in the state34 coupled with a purposeful availment of the benefits and protections of the forum 
state.35  Specific jurisdiction is transactional, case-specific, and unpredictable.36  A set of 
targeted sales that are part of a marketing strategy, advertising, or other direct and specific 
relationships coupled with purposeful availment would probably be sufficient.37   
 
For those seeking redress for the U.S.-based harms caused by foreign IP and IT theft, specific 
jurisdiction cases potentially pose a significant challenge.  If a foreign entity has “set up shop” in 
the forum state (having a place of business, employees, and localized marketing) and has a long-
term, on-going business, it is likely that it is subject to general jurisdiction and can be held 
accountable in court much the same as any resident of the state.  In contrast, when products made 
abroad using stolen IT or IP “appear” in a state and are sold by others, the challenge for victims 
is to show that the sale or use of the product is not an incidental or sporadic transaction that 
would be outside the requirements for specific jurisdiction. 
 
The questions specific jurisdiction present are challenging, particularly for transactions that do 
not involve extensive contacts, multiple sales, or long-term transactions.  In McGee v. 
International Life Insurance, the Court found a single sale or a single contact could be sufficient: 
“[a] single purposeful contact is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction if the cause of action 
arises from that contact.”38  McGee was clarified months after it was decided by Hansen v. 
                                                 
32 Helicopteros Nacionales,  466 U.S. at 415. 
33 The Supreme Court recently explained the distinction in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. 
Brown, 131 S.Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (citations omitted): “A court may assert general jurisdiction over 
foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) [defendants] when their affiliations with the State are so 
‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum State. Specific jurisdiction 
. . . depends on an ‘affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,’ principally, activity or 
an occurrence that takes place in the forum State. . . . [S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of 
“issues deriving from, or connected with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction.”  
34 Carteret Sav. Bank, FA v. Shushan, 954 F.2d 141, 147 (3d Cir. 1992); North Penn Gas Co. v. Corning 
Natural Gas Corp., 897 F.2d 687, 690 (3d Cir. 1990); Marvel Worldwide, Inc. v. Kirby, 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 38701 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
35 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 
U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Pervasive Software, Inc. v. Lexware GMBH & Co. KG, 688 F.3d 214 (5th Cir. 
2012); Shamsuddin v. Vitamin Research Prods., 346 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813 (D. Md. 2004).  
36 Lake Assocs. v. DNZ Products, ––– F.Supp.2d ––––, 2012 WL 3573892, at *5, (D. Or. Aug. 20, 2012) 
(quoting Synthes (U.S.A.) v. G.M. Dos Reis Jr. Ind. Com de Equip. Medico, 563 F.3d 1285, 1297 (Fed. 
Cir. 2009) (“Neither the United States Supreme Court nor the Federal Circuit ‘has outlined a specific test 
to follow when analyzing whether a defendant's activities within a forum are continuous and systematic.’ 
Instead, the ‘court must look at the facts of each case to make such a determination.’”). 
37 Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102 (1987). 
38 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957). 
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Denkla,39 which shifted the focus from the notion of a single sale or transaction to the more 
demanding set of tests found in International Shoe centering on fairness, minimum contacts, and 
purposeful availment of the legal regime of the state.  Hansen held that the plaintiff must show 
that “the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the 
forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws . . . .”40   
 
Twenty years later, the Court refined Hansen in Shaffer v. Heitner,41 requiring that presence or 
contacts of the defendant to be sufficient to meet the due process fair play and reasonability 
requirements, and Kulko v. Superior Court,42 reiterating the minimum contacts test and 
discussing the interests of the plaintiff and the state.  In cases of IT or IP theft, for specific 
jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that the defendant “purposely direct his activities at residents 
of the forum . . . and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or are related to 
those activities.”43  The conduct should be sufficient such that foreign national[s] should 
“reasonably anticipate being haled into court . . . .”44  These requirements suggest that the 
conscious marketing choices and expectations of the defendant – the nature of the defendant’s 
action – not the harm to the plaintiff, are the central considerations in determining the presence 
or absence of in personam jurisdiction.     
 
b. Asahi and Nicastro – the Plot Thickens 
 
In 1987, the question of the nature of the sufficiency of defendant’s actions or contact with the 
forum for purposes of in personam jurisdiction came to a head in Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior 
Court.45  In that case, the plaintiff’s wife was killed when a motorcycle they were riding collided 
with a tractor.  The accident occurred in California and allegedly was caused by a defect in one 
of the motorcycle tires as well as a defect in the valve in that tire.  The tire was made by Cheng 
Shin Rubber, a Taiwanese company, and the valve was made by Asahi Metal Industry Company, 
a Japanese company.   
 
About 20% of Cheng Shin’s U.S. sales were in California, and while there was some 
disagreement between the parties, it is safe to conclude that a meaningful number of Chen Shin 
tires sold in California had Asahi valves.  Before judgment, the plaintiff settled with Cheng Shin 
Rubber.  Chen Shin then filed a cross-claim against Asahi in California seeking 
indemnification.46  Chen Shin asserted that the court had in personam jurisdiction over Asahi 
based on the fact that Asahi could foresee the presence of its products in California and was 
unquestionably aware that a meaningful number of its products were sold in California.  
 
Asahi argued that it was not subject to the jurisdiction of the California courts because it had 
insufficient contacts with the forum state, the trial would be highly inconvenient, an 
                                                 
39 Hansen v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
40 Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253. 
41 433 U.S. 186, 216 (1977). 
42 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978). 
43 Burger King, Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). 
44 Id. at 474 (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). 
45 480 U.S. 102 (1987).  
46 Id. 
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indemnification claim could and should be litigated in Japan, and that it never contemplated 
being sued in the U.S.  Further, Asahi had no employees, offices, or real estate in California, nor 
did it make direct sales or solicit business in California.  
 
Based on these facts, the Court asked “whether the mere awareness on the part of a foreign 
defendant that the components it manufactured . . . would reach the forum State [and enter] the 
stream of commerce constitutes “minimum contacts” between the defendant and the forum State 
such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend `traditional notions of fair play and 
substantial justice.’”47  
 
The Court found that even if one assumes Asahi was aware of the California sales of the Chen 
Shin products with the Asahi valves and the products were, broadly defined, in the stream of 
commerce, Asahi did not “purposefully avail itself of the California market. . . . It [had] no 
office, agents, employees, or property in California [and did not] advertise or otherwise solicit 
business in California. It [was not involved in the] distribution system that brought its valves to 
California.”  Consequently, the Court found insufficient contacts to satisfy the Due Process 
minimum contact rules.48   
 
On the question of fairness and substantial justice, the Court noted that since the defendant Asahi 
was a foreign company (raising problems of convenience and witness availability) and since the 
plaintiffs (Cheng Chin is the plaintiff in the cross-claim) were not California residents, the 
interest of the forum state was limited.  This is an important consideration for IT and IP theft 
cases and suggests that an action against a foreign entity brought by a state resident or the State 
Attorney General on behalf of all the state might be treated differently than an action brought by 
a non-resident.  As noted later in this paper, a state court has a powerful interest in hearing 
claims brought by the State on behalf of its residents.  The Asahi Court made clear this 
distinction, finding that when there are minimum contacts and the plaintiffs are state residents (or 
the state itself), “the exercise of jurisdiction will justify even the serious burdens placed on the 
alien defendant.”49 
 
The Court concluded with guidance on the assertion of jurisdiction over foreign defendants, 
noting concerns about fairness and convenience as well as international relations.  Relying on a 
1965 case, the Court cautioned that “[g]reat care and reserve should be exercised when extending 
our notions of personal jurisdiction into the international field.”50  Nowhere in the Asahi opinion 
does the Court suggest that similar care should be given to protecting the rights and entitlements 
of domestic victims of wrongful conduct. 
 
It is anyone’s guess whether the Court intended to re-write requirements for in personam 
jurisdiction in an atypical case involving a component-part third-party indemnification dispute 
between two foreign entities (one out-of-state and the other out-of-the-U.S.).  This was not a case 
                                                 
47480 U.S. at 105, citing International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
48 Id. at 112. 
49 Id. at 114. 
50 480 U.S. at 116, citing United States v. First National City Bank, 379 U.S. 378, 404 (1965) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting).   
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involving the rights of an in-state plaintiff harmed by the acts of a foreign defendant.  Though 
written by a divided court,51 Asahi initiated a jurisprudential mudslide, dividing federal circuits 
and state courts.52  As became evident a decade and a half later, the rifts in Asahi are still present 
on the Court and evident in the Court’s more recent Nicastro53 and Goodyear54 decisions, 
discussed infra.   
 
However one reads Asahi, it reflects abundant concern for foreign defendants and left domestic 
plaintiffs with an uncertain burden.  Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion rejected the notion that 
in personam jurisdiction necessarily can be found with single sales and limited contacts, even if 
the contact or sales are foreseeable and intentional and even if such sales were in the “stream of 
commerce” of the state.  In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan disagreed, accepting the 
argument that knowing and foreseeable placement of a product in the “stream of commerce” of a 
state is adequate for purposes of in personam jurisdiction.  The O’Connor perspective could 
make it difficult for victims of foreign IP or IT theft to “hale” into court a foreign defendant who 
merely uses or sells, on their own or through a domestic retailers, goods made with stolen IT or 
IP.  The Brennan perspective makes such cases more viable – but Brennan’s opinion was not 
endorsed by a majority of the Court in the primary opinion in the case. As the next section 
indicates, the split between these two points of view persists.   
   
 
                                                 
51 In fact, one would be hard-pressed to see Asahi as crisp legal precedent or a clear determination of law.  
The case generated three opinions, and only the first part of the first opinion, written by Justice O’Connor, 
was joined by a majority.  In the remainder of her opinion (a plurality), Justice O’Connor was joined only 
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Powell and Scalia.  Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and 
Blackmun concurred separately in a second opinion, and Justice Stevens, White, and Blackmun wrote a 
third opinion. 
52 Asahi (and its many interpretations) has been cited more than 4000 times by state and federal courts and 
is the subject of countless law review articles, e.g., Kristianna L. Sciarra, Note: A Gap in Personal 
Jurisdiction Reasoning: An Analysis of J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 
195 (2013); Danielle Tarin & Christopher Macchiaroli, Refining the Due Process Contours of General 
Jurisdiction Over Foreign Manufacturers, 11 J. INT'L BUS. & L. 49 (2012); Todd David Peterson, The 
Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 202 (2011); Rodger 
D. Citron, The Last Common Law Justice: The Personal Jurisdiction Jurisprudence of Justice John Paul 
Stevens, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 433 (2011) (critiquing Justice Stevens's Asahi opinion);  Diane S. 
Kaplan, Paddling up the Wrong Stream: Why the Stream of Commerce Theory is Not Part of the 
Minimum Contacts Doctrine, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 503 (2003); Linda J. Silberman, "Two Cheers" for 
International Shoe (and None for Asahi): An Essay on the Fiftieth Anniversary of International Shoe, 28 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755 (1995); Christine M. Wiseman, Reconstructing the Citadel: The Advent of 
Jurisdictional Privity, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 403, 424-37 (1993) (criticizing Asahi.); Bruce Posnak, The Court 
Doesn't Know Its Asahi from Its Wortman: A Critical View of Constitutional Constraints of Jurisdiction 
and Choice of Law, 41 Syracuse L. Rev. 875 (1990); Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to Minimum Contacts: 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 39 S.C. L. Rev. 729 (1988); Earl M. Maltz, Unraveling the 
Conundrum of the Law of Personal Jurisdiction: A Comment on Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, 1987 Duke L.J. 669 (1987). 
53 J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, __U.S.__,131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011). 
54 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011). 
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In 2011, the Court decided J.McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro,55 a case that raised many of the 
questions posed and only partially answered in Asahi.  During the course of his employment, 
plaintiff Robert Nicastro, a New Jersey resident, sustained permanent disabling injuries to his 
hand while using a machine manufactured by the British company, J. McIntyre Machinery. The 
machine was imported into the U.S. by an Ohio company and then sold to Nicastro’s employer. 
J. McIntyre Machinery had sold four machines to New Jersey companies, intended its machines 
to be sold in the U.S., sent trade representatives to U.S. trade shows, held U.S. patents on its 
products, and, through a U.S. company, advertised its products in the U.S.  In short, the goods 
were intended for U.S. use and had entered the U.S. stream of commerce.   
 
A plurality of the Court held that while the defendant benefited from U.S. commerce, it had not 
“personally avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus 
[not invoked] the benefits and protections of its laws.”56  Even if the goods were in the state’s 
stream of commerce, the plurality found a defendant (1) must target the forum state and (2) 
purposely avail itself of the rights and protections of that state.  The plurality held that a 
defendant’s actions in seeking the protection of the forum or using its laws was the proper 
measure of the sufficiency of the contacts with the state, not the foreseeable presence of their 
products.    
 
While the case could have clarified the confusion left by Asahi, the Court was unable to make a 
crisp and clear statement to guide future courts.  The case was decided by a plurality and rejected 
(to the extent a plurality can be dispositive57) the idea that a targeted, foreseeable sale in a state 
on its own is sufficient for in personam jurisdiction.  If the best that can be said is that a product 
is in the stream of commerce and foreseeably made available for sale in the forum state, the 
Nicastro plurality found that insufficient for purposes of specific or general jurisdiction.58    
 
Justice Breyer noted in his concurrence in Nicastro that while the foreign “[m]anufacturer 
permitted, indeed wanted, its independent American distributor to sell its machines to anyone in 
America willing to buy them,” it was unfair to hale the defendant into court without more 
extensive contacts with the forum state.59  Justice Breyer noted his concern for small foreign 
defendants who have caused injury to persons in the U.S.  He characterized as “unfair” making 
foreign defendants accountable in court, expressing concern about the burden of making foreign 
entities “understand not only the tort law of every State, but also the wide variance in the way 
courts within different States apply that law.”60  Deep concern for fairness to foreign defendants 
                                                 
55 131 S. Ct. at 2780 (2011). 
56 Id. at 2787-88, citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
57 Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon of Constitutional Law, 
17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 327-28 (2000) (noting the complexity of identifying a rule or holding in a 
case decided by a plurality); Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the 
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419 (1992); John F. Davis & 
William L. Reynolds, Juridical Cripples: Plurality Opinions in the Supreme Court, Duke L.J. 59 (1974). 
58 J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2789. 
59 Id. at 2791. 
60 Id. at 2794.   
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dominates the opinions61 – and one is hard-pressed to find an equal concern for U.S victims of 
misconduct.  Further, just how this is any more unfair than it would be for out-of-state domestic 
defendants who cause injury is not part of the dialogue.  Interests that are so fundamental – 
specifically IP or IT created by a U.S. entity or person – ought not be so difficult to protect.  
 
III. Misconduct, Minimum Contacts, and Maximum Confusion 
 
As just discussed, there is abundant precedent detailing when courts are prohibited from 
exercising jurisdiction over foreign defendants, raising this obvious question: Do clear and 
uniform criteria exist to indicate when it is permissible for a court to protect the interests of those 
victimized by foreign entities and individuals?  
 
There is logic to the notion that if a product is foreseeably present in the U.S., designed for 
domestic sales, that should be sufficient for finding in personam jurisdiction over a foreign user 
or seller.  However, the plurality in Nicastro found a single transaction or isolated sales of a 
product is insufficient to support jurisdiction – even if the presence is foreseeable.62  Instead, a 
regular flow of goods in a particular jurisdiction must be coupled with actions demonstrating that 
the seller or manufacturer availed themselves of the market opportunities and the rights and 
protections of the legal system in the forum state.63  Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Nicastro 
also suggests the importance of evidence of special domestic customer lists that the foreign 
manufacturer has developed, coupled with property the manufacturer owns, employees the 
foreign manufacturer retains, or proof of other tangible resources.64  It is not hard to imagine that 
foreign manufacturers that steal IP and IT and then sell their products through U.S. wholesalers 
and retailers often will have little need for the indicia of state contacts suggested both the 
plurality and Justice Breyer’s concurrence in Nicastro.  
  
 
a. Domestic Subsidiaries 
 
Given the profitability of those involved with IT or IP theft and the difficulties associated with in 
personam jurisdiction, it is worth asking whether the minimum contact problem might be solved 
if the seller or user in the forum state is a subsidiary of a foreign parent company.65  If the 
                                                 
61 GSS Grp. v. Nat’l Port Auth., 680 F.3d 805 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Both the Supreme Court and this court 
have repeatedly held that foreign corporations may invoke due process protections to challenge the 
exercise of personal jurisdiction. . . . See, e.g., Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850–51, 2853; J. McIntyre, 131 
S. Ct. 2785, 2789–90 . . . .In each of those instances, the foreign defendant was . . . “alien to our 
constitutional system” [yet] the court did not hesitate to afford the defendant the full measure of due 
process protection. (internal citations and footnotes omitted). 
62 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2784. 
63 Id.  
64 See Jones v. Fairbanks Reconstruction Corp., No. 11-cv-437, 2012 WL 3990089 (D. Me. Sept. 11, 
2012) (“This ‘mere awareness’ that products will reach Maine via the stream of commerce cannot support 
the exercise of specific jurisdiction . . . .(citing Asahi & Goodyear). . . . [The] stream of commerce 
doctrine cannot serve as a basis for general personal jurisdiction.”(citations omitted)). 
65 Am. Tel. & Tel Co. v. Compagnie Bruxelles Lambert, 94 F.3d 586, 590 (9th Cir. 1996); Hargrave v. 
Fibreboard Corp., 710 F.2d 1154, 1159 (5th Cir. 1983); Boryk v. De Havilland Aircraft Co., 341 F.2d 
666 (2d Cir. 1965). 
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subsidiary is owned and fully controlled by the foreign parent, the chances of haling the parent 
into a U.S. court increases.  However the corporate relationship is articulated, because the 
minimum contact rule is about personal jurisdiction, there must be something about the parents’ 
personal contact with the forum state – not just the subsidiary’s contact.   
 
In Hargrave v. Fiberboard,66 the court held: “Generally a foreign parent corporation is not 
subject to the jurisdiction of a forum state merely because its subsidiary is present or doing 
business there; the mere existence of a parent-subsidiary relationship is not sufficient to warrant 
the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign parent.”  The parent must exert “domination and 
control of its subsidiary [such that] they do not in reality constitute a separate and distinct 
corporate entit[y] but are one in the same corporation for purposes of jurisdiction . . . .”67   
 
The problem, of course, is that foreign entities engaged in IT theft or using stolen IT in the 
production of goods are probably smart enough to keep their subsidiaries separate or to use 
independent sellers within the United States with whom they have no formal long-term corporate 
ownership relationship.  In Hargrave, the court found that a domestic company can be construed 
as a dependent subsidiary based on the amount of stock of the subsidiary the parent controls, the 
extent to which they share headquarters, officers, director, corporate formalities, accounting 
systems, and overall authority for the day-to-day operation of the subsidiary.68  Looking broadly 
at IT and IP theft over the last decade, it is not clear how many parties involved in these cases 
would meet that test. 
 
b. Non-affiliated Users or Sellers 
 
Outside of a parent-subsidiary relationship, the rules begin to blur, depending on the state and the 
circumstances.  Illinois for example, has a fairly broad (and somewhat unique) interpretation of 
the elemental fairness requirements in personam jurisdiction. Recently those standards were set 
out in Russell v. SNFA.: “To determine reasonableness, courts consider the following factors: (1) 
the burden on the defendant; (2) the forum states’ interest in resolving the dispute; (3) the 
plaintiff’s interest in obtaining relief; (4) the interest of the effects forums, including the forum 
state, in the most efficient resolution of the dispute; (5) the interests of the effected forums in the 
advancement of substantive social policies.”69  For the minimum contact formulation, Russell is 
one of a handful of post-Nicastro cases following Brennan’s stream of commerce theory.   
 
The Russell case involved a deadly 2003 Agusta helicopter crash.  The helicopter was built in 
Italy, with parts made in France, exported through a German company, and ultimately ended up 
in Illinois where the accident occurred.70  The court found it noteworthy that the defendant 
SNFA did “not deny that it knew that Agusta helicopters were sold throughout the United 
States… [and did] not deny that it knew Agusta had an American subsidiary for purposes of 
distribution….”  Relying on the reasonable foreseeability of the presence of the product - thus 
satisfying Brennan’s stream of commernce test – the Illinois court exercised jurisdiction over the 
                                                 
66 Hargrave, 710 F.2d at 1159. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 1160. 
69 408 Ill. App. 3d 827, (1st Dist. 2011), aff’d Russell v. SNFA, 965 N.E.2d 1073 (2012).   
70 Russell, 965 N.E.2d at 3-4. 
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foreign defendants.  That the defendant knowingly accessed the legal system of the state or 
contemplated and planned to benefit from that system was not established, thus diluting the 
overblown importance of conscious availment in Nicastro.  Unfortunately, Russell is the 
exception, not the rule.     
 
Similar to Russell is Willemsen v. Invacare,71 a post-Nicastro opinion from Oregon.  Plaintiff’s 
mother was killed in a fire allegedly caused by a defect in the battery of her motorized 
wheelchair.  Plaintiffs are Oregon residents.  Invacare built the wheelchair at its Ohio plant.  The 
battery was manufactured by CTE, a Taiwanese company.  CTE made its batteries pursuant to 
contract specifications set by Invacare and agreed to indemnify Invacare for liability resulting 
from problems with the battery.  CTE disputed the finding of personal jurisdiction, claiming that 
much like Asahi, local courts in its domicile (Thailand) were more convenient.  CTE argued 
further that there were insufficient contacts with Oregon to satisfy the requirements for in 
personam jurisdiction set out in Nicastro. 
 
The Oregon court disagreed, suggesting that neither Asahi nor Nicastro provided a clear signal 
on critical personal jurisdiction questions.  The court found that when “a fragmented Court 
decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the 
holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in 
the judgmen[t] on the narrowest grounds . . . .”72  Freed from the most restrictive parts of the 
plurality in Nicastro, the court found an adequate relationship between the state and the 
defendant CTE.  This decision was based on the number of sales and the indemnification 
agreement that suggested CTE anticipated a role in legal proceedings, thus meeting the availment 
requirement. The court noted as sufficient “a regular course of sales” or “regular . . . flow” of the 
defendant’s product into the forum state.73  The court found such activities can form a foundation 
for specific jurisdiction since one could conclude that under these circumstances, a foreign 
defendant “anticipated the need to defend against the very sort of claim that the plaintiffs [filed 
in this case]. . . .”74   
 
The Willemsen court held that it does not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial 
justice” to exert jurisdiction over a foreign company that benefits from sales in a state, foresees 
those sales, and therefore, anticipates the potential of liability from those sales.75  Foreseeability 
of presence is a logical factor to consider – and one that is not the norm.76  Outside of cases like 
Russell or Willemsen or subsidiary relationships that meet the criteria mentioned above, victims 
of IT or IP theft are left with the uncertainty of Asahi and the negative text of the Nicastro 
plurality.77 For many items produced abroad using stolen IP or IT and designed for sale in the 
                                                 
71 282 P.3d 867 (Ore. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 984; 184 L. Ed. 2d 762 (2013).  
72 282 P. 3d 200, citing Marks v. United States, 430 US 188 (1977) (internal quotation marks omitted), 
and Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 US 930, 949 (2007). 
73 Id. at 877. 
74 Id.  
75 Id. 
76 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. 444 U.S. at 295 (“Yet ‘foreseeability’ alone has never been a sufficient 
benchmark for personal jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause.”). 
77 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102; J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro,__U.S.__,131 S. Ct. 2780, 88-90 
(2011).  
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U.S., if the most that can be said is that they are foreseeably present, in personam jurisdiction is 
unlikely to be found.  As noted earlier, per Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion,78 foreseeable 
presence, simpliciter, is insufficient for minimum contacts.    
 
Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion has generated a quarter century of debate and a pronounced 
conflict between the circuits.79  As the dissenting opinion in Nicastro points out, the post-Asahi 
measures of in personam jurisdiction leave something to be desired.  Contact with a forum, if 
measured by marketing strategies, employees, property, advertising, and access to or benefits 
from the legal system of the state, have nothing to do with the selling price of a product – yet 
courts use both the value of sales, selling price, and the volume of sales to measure the 
sufficiency of contacts.  As Justice Ginsburg noted: “By dollar value, the price of a single 
machine represents a significant sale. Had a manufacturer sold in New Jersey $24,900 worth of 
flannel shirts, see Nelson v. Park Indus. Inc.,80 cigarette lighters,81 or wire-rope splices,82 the 
Court would presumably find the defendant amenable to suit in that State.”83  Consider that 
benefitting from the market available in a particular state was translated into “targeting” a forum 
state – and targeting was measured by bulk sales and price, this seems hardly a rational approach.    
 
The question of whether stream of commerce, foreseeable presence, or something more is 
required has been answered differently by courts.  Professor Angela McLaughlin recently studied 
the variation – or more accurately, disagreement – between the circuits.84  Based on her research, 
she concluded that the First Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, the Second Circuit is inconclusive, 
the Third Circuit is inconclusive, the Fourth Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, the Fifth Circuit 
follows Justice Brennan (with some qualifications), the Sixth Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, 
the Seventh Circuit appears to follow Justice Brennan, the Eight Circuit appears to follow both, 
the Ninth Circuit follows Justice O’Connor, the Tenth Circuit follows both, the Eleventh Circuit 
follows Justice Brennan, and the Federal Circuit has declined to decide the question.85 For 
victims of IT or IP theft, this disconcerting discord generated by Asahi and Nicastro only adds to 
the instability in the field and suggests that conventional protection of property rights is 
unavailable or unreliable in Article III courts.    
 
Much of the controversy generated by Asahi involves disagreements around the importance of 
knowing placement of a product into the stream of commerce of a state.  The problem in Justice 
O’Connor’s opinion is not one of clarity: “The placement of product into the stream of 
commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant purposely directed at the forum state.”86  
It is the implication that is troubling.  Consider that under this formulation, deciding to sell goods 
                                                 
78 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 102-107. 
79 Choice Healthcare v. Kaiser Found. Health Plans, 615 F.3d 364, 373 (5th Cir. 2010). 
80 717 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1983). 
81 See Oswalt v. Scripto, Inc., 616 F.2d 191 (5th Cir. 1980) 
82 Hedrick v. Daiko Shoji Co., 715 F.2d 1355 (9th  Cir. 1983). 
83 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2804, Dissent, per Justice Ginsburg, N.15, in text citations moved to footnotes. 
84 Angela M. Laughlin, This Ain’t the Texas Two-Step Folks: Disharmony, Confusion, and the Unfair 
Nature of Personal Jurisdiction Analysis in the Fifth Circuit, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 681, 727-28 app’x A 
(2000). 
85 Id. at 727-28 app’x A. 
86 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 112 (O’Connor, J. discussing stream of commerce theory). 
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in the forum state and then selling those goods is not sufficient to make a company or a seller 
subject to the laws of that state.   
 
Justice Brennan’s Asahi view differs fundamentally on the meaning of stream of commerce: 
“[S]tream of commerce refers . . . to the regular and anticipated flow of products from 
manufacture to distribution to retail sale.  As long as a participant in this process is aware that the 
final product is being marketed in the forum state the possibility of a lawsuit there cannot come 
as a surprise. . . . A defendant who has placed goods in the stream of commerce benefits 
economically from the retail sale of the final product in forum state, and indirectly benefits from 
the state’s laws that regulate and facilitate commercial activity. . . .”87  Under this formulation, 
deciding to sell goods in the forum state and then selling those goods is probably sufficient for in 
personam jurisdiction.  The problem, however, is that this formulation is outright rejected by the 
plurality in Nicastro.88 
 
According to Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Nicastro (writing for himself, Roberts, Scalia, and 
Thomas), Justice Brennan was simply wrong.89  According to the dissent in Nicastro, Brennan 
was on the right track90 – and yet, as of today, to be blunt, there is no track.  This dissonance 
enables courts, if they chose, to chart their own path on the question of in personam jurisdiction.   
 
The language of a recent case from the New Mexico Court of Appeals reflects the void: 
“Because J. McIntyre Machinery did not produce a majority opinion adopting either Justice 
O'Connor's or Justice Brennan's stream of commerce theory, [we] adhere to our [in-state] 
precedents, at least until the United States Supreme Court resolves the twenty-five-year-old 
uncertainty over whether stream of commerce theory is sufficient to establish the required 
minimum contacts and, if so, how it should be applied.”91   
 
A federal court in Georgia has a similar approach: “The Supreme Court has held that “placing 
goods into the stream of commerce ‘with the expectation that they will be purchased by 
consumers within the forum State’ may indicate purposeful availment” [quotes omitted]. . . . 
[citing Nicastro].  [However, in] Asahi . . . four Justices believed that a defendant must do 
“something more” than merely deliver its product into the stream of commerce . . . . [citing 
Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Asahi]. . . . [T]he Supreme Court has declined to reconcile the two 
approaches.”92   
 
                                                 
87 Id. at 117 (Brennan, J., concurring in part). 
88 J. McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2789 (“But Justice Brennan's concurrence, advocating a rule based on general 
notions of fairness and foreseeability, is inconsistent with the premises of lawful judicial power. This 
Court's precedents make clear that it is the defendant's actions, not his expectations, that empower a 
State's courts to subject him to judgment.”) 
89 Id. at 2789. 
90 Id. at 2803 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
91 Sproul v. Rob & Charlies, Inc., No. 31,167, 2012 WL 6662638, *15 (N.M. Ct. App. Aug. 15, 2012). 
92 Atlantis Hydroponics v. Int’l Growers Supply, No. 12-cv-1206, 2013 WL 28102, *7 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 3, 
2013). 
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Prior to Nicastro, courts had begun to use the Brennan stream of commerce test more liberally.93  
Since that decision, however, courts have been less inclined.94  For example, in Dow Chemical 
Canada v. Superior Court 95 the court focused on an O’Connor-like view of purposeful 
availment and targeted activities conducted within the forum state and denied in personam 
jurisdiction, notwithstanding the foreseeable presence of the defendant’s product in the forum 
state.  In Van Heeswyk v. Jabiru Aircraft,96 the court applied Nicastro, finding that “predictable” 
contacts were insufficient.  The court noted that there was a distinct difference between the 
predictability or foreseeability that the defendant’s goods would be sold in the state and those 
instances where the defendant “can be said to have targeted the forum.”  Whether foreign 
manufacturers that produce goods made with or using stolen IT or IP target a particular state will 
be difficult to predict in many if not most cases. 
 
While it seems only fair that victims should be able to bring a claim in any state where they have 
been adversely affected, the targeting requirement remains an obstacle to accountability.97  In 
Oticon, Inc. v. Sebotek Hearing Systems,98 the federal court, interpreting both New Jersey and 
Supreme Court jurisprudence, found that while “Nicastro does not clearly or conclusively define 
the breadth and scope of the stream of commerce theory … Nicastro stands for the proposition 
that targeting the national market is not enough to impute jurisdiction to all the forum states.”99 
 
                                                 
93 Vang v. Whitby Tool & Eng'g Co., 484 F. Supp. 2d 966 (D. Minn. 2007) (finding jurisdiction over a 
company that was neither licensed or had agents or property in the state but sold its product within the 
state through a distributor was aware that the product would be used in the forum state); Barone v. Rich 
Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co., 25 F.3d 610 (8th Cir. 1994) (applying stream of commerce 
theory); Falkirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd., 906 F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1990). 
94 AFTG-TG, LLC v. Nuvoton Tech. Corp., 689 F.3d 1358, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding a lack of 
jurisdiction and acknowledging that Nicastro was not definitive on the efficacy of the stream of 
commerce approach); Sieg v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 855 F. Supp. 2d 320 (M.D. Pa. 2012); but see 
Original Creations, Inc. v. Ready Am., Inc., 836 F. Supp. 2d 711 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (finding that since 
Nicastro was decided by a plurality, courts are free to follow the law of their forum or circuit and apply 
the stream of commerce test).    
95 202 Cal. App. 4th 170 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (the mere awareness of the defendant’s product finding its 
way into the forum state, a single sale, or even a number of sales within a state would be insufficient 
outside of meeting targeting, purposeful availment, or the sustained and continuous contact requirements). 
96 229 Ariz. 412, 418 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012). 
97 While one might think the Federal Circuit would formulate its own standards and perhaps be more 
accommodating to those who seek to protect copyrighted material or IP or IT that otherwise enjoys 
governmental protection, that is not the case.  The Federal Circuit requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that 
the defendant availed themselves purposefully of the protections and benefits of the forum state involved 
and that the exercise of jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice 
echoing the plurality in Nicastro. LSI Industries, Inc. v. Hubbell Lighting, Inc., 232 F.3d 1369, 1375 n.5 
(Fed. Cir. 2000); Akro v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1544-45 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Bluestone Innovations Tex. v. 
Formosa Epitaxy, 822 F. Supp. 2d 657 (E.D. Tex. 2011), citing Int’l Shoe 326 U.S. at 316-320; Burger 
King, 471 U.S. at 462. See e.g., Emissive Energy v. SPA Simrad, 788 F. Supp. 2d 40 (D.R.I. 2011) . 
98 865 F. Supp. 501 (D.N.J. 2011). 
99 Id. 865 F. Supp. 2d at 513. 
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In short, Nicastro has left litigants in a state of confusion.100  One commentator notes that 
Nicastro “left long-standing questions about personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers 
foggy…”101  The Supreme Court does not seem inclined to lift the fog and clear the air.  
 
IV. Calder and the Effect of Intentionality on In Personam Jurisdiction 
 
A different way of thinking about the problem above is to take a step back and consider the 
underlying substantive act: theft, which is undeniably an intentional act of misconduct. 
Characterized as IP and IT thieves, defendants fall in a special jurisdictional category: 
jurisdiction over perpetrators of intentional misconduct.  Intentional acts causing harm are 
simply not in the same category as negligent acts and they allow for a different jurisdictional 
calculus.102  In the plurality opinion of Nicastro, after referring to the Shirley Jones libel case, 
Calder v. Jones,103 the Court recognized the distinction and held as follows: “[I]n some cases, as 
with an intentional tort, the defendant might well fall within the state’s authority by reason of his 
attempt to obstruct its laws.”104  The Nicastro decision’s reference to Calder raises a 
fundamental question: since theft of IT or IP is an intentional act, what would prevent a court 
from recognizing “Calder-effect” jurisdiction as a basis to exert in personam jurisdiction over a 
foreign manufacturer using stolen IT whose products are exported to and sold in the United 
States?    
 
a. The Calder Doctrine 
 
Calder-effect jurisdiction permits courts to provide a remedy for acts of intentional misconduct 
where the jurisdictional focus is more on the act performed outside the forum state that causes 
harm within the forum state rather than on the Asahi/Nicastro commercial connection of the 
defendant to the forum.105  To be clear, Calder does not apply to “untargeted negligence” and   
does require a case-by-case assessment of the intentional act in question to determine if the 
                                                 
100 There is one alternative mode of analysis based on Fed. R. Civ. P.  4(K)(2) providing that if a 
“defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any state’s court of general jurisdiction . . . exercise of 
jurisdiction is consistent with the United States Constitution. . . . .” Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. Rule 4. For this 
provision to apply, the plaintiff’s claim must arise under federal law and the basic fairness requirements 
of due process must be satisfied. Touchcom v. Bereskin & Parr, 574 F.3d 1403, 1413 (Fed. Cir. 2009). To 
an extent, this rule can be seen as default federal court jurisdiction, although the application of the 
minimum contacts and due process rules have rendered this provision the exception and not the rule for 
most cases in which forum jurisdiction is contested.  Perhaps more importantly for IP and IT cases, if 
there is an available forum for resolution of a claim in the U.S. or abroad, the case rule does not apply. 
Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malay. Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422 (2007) (finding that since the contacts, 
parties, and the initial legal dispute where more conveniently heard in China, the case must be dismissed). 
101 Greg Ryan, High Court Leaves Liability Jurisdiction Foggy for Foreign COS, LAW 360, (Oct. 9, 
2012), www.law360.com/articles/385022/print?section=productliability.  
102 O. W. Holmes, THE COMMON LAW 3 (1881) (“Universally, harmful conduct is considered more 
reprehensible if intentional. . . . Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and being 
kicked.”). 
103 Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984). 
104 Nicastro, 131 S.Ct. at 2787. 
105 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90. 
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aiming requirement is met.106  While Calder was a libel case,107 courts have recognized that 
“[t]he Supreme Court did not intend the Calder ‘effects' test to apply only in libel cases.”108  
  
Given the unquestionable condemnation of intentional misconduct, courts should be more 
inclined to protect their residents from the domestic harms arising from such misconduct (even if 
the misconduct occurred abroad), particularly if no other domestic forum is available for the 
resolution of their claims.  This principal is recognized in the Restatement (2nd) of Conflict of 
Laws: “When the act was done with the intention of causing the particular effect [in the state], 
the state is likely to have judicial jurisdiction though the defendant has no other contact with the 
state.  This will almost surely be so when the effect involves injury to person or damage to 
tangible property.”109   
 
In Guidry v. United States Tobacco,110 the court found that the commission of an intentional tort 
“within the state, or an act outside the state that causes tortious injury within the state, 
[constitutes] sufficient minimum contacts within the state by the defendant to constitutionally 
permit courts within that state, including federal courts, to exercise personal adjudicative 
jurisdiction over the tortfeasor and the causes of actions arising from the offenses or quasi-
offenses.”   Some courts have held that even a single intentional act giving rise to injury in a 
forum state can be sufficient for a finding of minimum contacts under Calder.111    
 
Unfortunately, Calder-effects jurisdiction is not perceived uniformly by courts or 
commentators.112  Some courts have found Calder-effects jurisdiction requires more than one act 
and may not be a substitute for a finding of minimum contacts demonstrating purposeful 
                                                 
106 Washington Show v. A-Z Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cir. 2012); Imo Indus. v. Kiekart 
AG, 155 F. 3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding that Calder can be applied to a variety of intentional 
torts). 
107 465 U.S. at 785. 
108 Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 117 F.3d 278, 286-87 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting Wallace v. Herron, 778 
F.2d 391, 395 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122, 90 L. Ed. 2d 187, 106 S. Ct. 1642 (1986); 
(cited in Guidry v. United States Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 629 (5th Cir. 1999); Emissive Energy v. SPA 
Simrad, 788 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46 (D.R.I. 2011). 
109 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 37 cmt. e (1971); See §36 cmt. a, cmt. c (“A state 
has an especial interest in exercising judicial jurisdiction over those who commit torts within its 
territory.”). 
110 188 F.3d 619, 628 (5th Cir. 1999);  Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997) 
("[T]here can be no serious doubt after Calder v. Jones, that the state in which the victim of a tort suffers 
the injury may entertain a suit against the accused tortfeasor.").  
111 Wein Air Alaska, Inc. v. Brandt, 195 F.3d 208, 211 (5th Cir. 1999). 
112 Current case law is in conflict.  Compare Calder minimum contact cases: Allred v. Moore & Peterson, 
117 F.3d 278, 286 (5th Cir. 1997) (“the effects test is not a substitute for a nonresident's minimum 
contacts that demonstrate purposeful availment of the benefits of the forum state.”) and Brokerwood Int'l 
(U.S.), Inc. v. Cuisine Crotone, Inc., 104 F. App'x 376, 381-82 (5th Cir. 2004) with Calder non-minimum 
contact cases: Miller Yacht Sales, Inc. v. Smith, 384 F.3d 93, 96 n.2 (3d Cir. 2004) (Calder subjects a 
party “to personal jurisdiction in a state when his or her tortious actions were intentionally directed at that 
state and those actions caused harm in that state.”), and Guidry v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 188 F.3d 619, 628 
(5th Cir. 1999) (“[A]n act done outside the state that has consequences or effects within the state will 
suffice as a basis of jurisdiction in a suit arising from those consequences if the effects are seriously 
harmful and were intended or highly likely to follow from the nonresident defendant's conduct.”).  
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availment within the forum state.113  Professor Cassandra Burke Robertson recently discussed 
Calder-effects jurisdiction, urging against an expansive reading.114  She noted that the Supreme 
Court “has not revisited” Calder jurisdiction since its decision in 1984 and questioned whether a 
misunderstanding of Calder could lead to circumvention of basic procedural requirements 
established for in personam jurisdiction.  She referenced Nicastro, noting that the exception for 
intentional torts remains unclear, though reasonable minds can differ on this point.115   
 
b. Aiming and the Brunt 
 
The most apparent challenge with applying Calder to a foreign manufacturer’s theft of IT, 
however, is how to address the express “aiming” component for such IP or IT theft.116  Calder 
requires that the acts of the defendant are aimed at or target the forum state.117  Some years ago, 
the Second Circuit held that if a defendant has “reason to believe” that its intentional misconduct 
would cause harm in a particular state, that might suffice to satisfy the aiming requirement in a 
Calder-effects case.118   
 
Theft of IT or IP has highly predictable consequences.  Products made with stolen IP or IT have 
a lower cost of production and, therefore, have the potential to artificially undercut costs incurred 
by, and prices offered by, a company that respects property rights and uses legal IT in its 
operations. This results in a market distortion and is harmful to both competitors (who abide by 
the rule of law and pay for their IT and IP) and to competition generally (since firms, in order to 
gain a competitive advantage, will -- at least on the margins -- invest greater resources into 
stealing IT and fewer resources into innovation, product improvements, etc.).  This will be true – 
and quite foreseeable – in any state where goods made through IT or IP piracy enter the stream 
of commerce. Whether recognition of this pernicious effect satisfies the aiming requirement is an 
open question.   
 
In Calder, the fact that the source of the libel (the National Enquirer) had large circulation in 
California, the state in which plaintiff Shirley Jones brought suit, was sufficient for the Court to 
find that the defendant had “aimed” at California or could anticipate being haled into court in 
that state.119  Using that reasoning in the case of IT or IP theft, if goods produced by a foreign 
defendant made with or using stolen IT or IP have significant sales in one state, the defendant 
should anticipate being haled to court in that state.  The problem is that the goods in question in 
                                                 
113 Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 804-805 (9th Cir. 2004); Bancroft & 
Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000); Kwik-Kopy Corp. v. Byers, 37 F. 
App’x 90, *5 (5th Cir. 2002); MLS Nat'l Med. Evaluation Servs. v. Templin, 812 F. Supp. 2d 788, 799-
800 (E.D. Mich. 2011).   
114 Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Personal Jurisdiction, 45 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1301, 1303 (2012). 
115 Dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justice Sotomayor and Justice Kagan. Nicastro at 
2794; Cassandra Burke Robertson, at 1303 (noting disagreement between various courts). 
116 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
117 Id. 
118 Chaiken v. VV Publ’g. Corp., 119 F. 3d 1018, 1029 (2nd Cir. 1997). 
119 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789-90. 
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many cases of IT or IP theft are sold in many states.  Does that mean there is Calder-effects 
jurisdiction in all states where the product is sold – or only in those states where the sales are 
substantial?  Since the Supreme Court has not clarified the meaning of Calder, one can only 
surmise what the outcome might be in any particular case.   
 
Professor A. Benjamin Spencer, explained that “perpetrators of intentional torts can ‘anticipate 
being haled into court’ in the place where the targets of their wrongful actions reside.”120  The 
11th circuit is one of the few to address the question of intentionality and aiming in Calder.  In 
Licciardello v. Lovelady,121 the court found that the Calder-effects test is focused on 
intentionality and purposefulness and not on the intention to have a specific effect in a particular 
forum.  Licciardiello suggests that it is perfectly reasonable to hale into court a defendant who 
engages in intentional misconduct – indeed, it is foreseeable.122 
 
The Calder opinion itself does not resolve the question of the extent to which a defendant must 
aim its misconduct at a particular jurisdiction.123  Instead, it made the assumption that intentional 
misconduct creates a separate category for the assessment of jurisdiction without resolving the 
meaning “express aiming.”124  Thus, not surprisingly, opinions vary regarding aiming in Calder-
effects cases.125  In IMO Industries v. Kiekert,126 the court found that a forum state must be the 
“focal point” of the intentional misconduct of a defendant in order to satisfy the requirements of 
Calder-effects jurisdiction. The Third Circuit then surveyed other circuits and found a similar 
perspective in the first, fourth, fifth, eight, and tenth circuits.127   
 
An important contrast to IMO is Cole v. Tobacco Institute.128 In that case, the defendant, a non-
U.S. tobacco company, evinced knowledge of potential liability in the U.S. and employed 
personnel who knowingly perpetuated fraud regarding the risks of tobacco use.  Based on these 
                                                 
120 A. Benjamin Spencer, Terminating Calder, “Effects” Based Jurisdiction in the Ninth Circuit After 
Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 197, 202 (2004) (citations omitted). 
121 Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d 1280, 1287-88 (11th Cir. 2008). 
122 Id. at 1287; see also Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Baltimore Football Club Ltd. Partnership, 34 
F.3d 410, 411, 412 (7th Cir. 1994) (upholding the assertion of Calder-effects jurisdiction against a 
Canadian defendant, a professional sports team, even though the only contact with the forum state was the 
periodic broadcast of the team’s games); ); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 475 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[t]he 
defendant must be chargeable with knowledge of the forum at which his conduct is directed in order to 
reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that forum.”). 
123  Ziegler v. Indian River County, 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the commission of an 
intentional tort that had an effect in the forum state met the requirements of Calder without additional 
documentation of contacts).  
124  Bancroft, 223 F.3d at 1088 (requiring express aiming in addition to foreseeability of contact or harm). 
125 Stephen Blecha, Note, Chipping Away at the Illinois Brick Wall: The Use of Calder Jurisdiction In 
State Indirect Purchaser Litigation, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 879, 895 (2012) (setting out the varying 
positions on the aiming requirement in Calder). 
126 IMO Industries v. Kiekert AG, 155 F.3d 254, 261 (3d Cir. 1998). 
127 Id. at 260; see Blecha at 895 (referring to Noonan v. Winston, 135 F.3d 85 (1st Cir.1998); Esab Group 
v. Centricut, 126 F.3d 617 (4th Cir. 1997), cert denied 523 U.S. 1048 (1998); Far W. Capital Inc. v. 
Towne, 46 F.3d 1071 (10th Cir. 1995); Gen. Electric Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376 (8th Cir. 
1993); and Southmark Corp. v. Life Investors, Inc., 851 F.2d 763 (5th Cir. 1998). 
128 Cole v. Tobacco Inst., 47 F. Supp. 2d 812 (E.D. Tex. 1999). 
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circumstances, the court rejected the notion of a precise focal point as a requirement for “express 
aiming,” finding instead that a defendant could not escape the jurisdiction of the court if its 
wrongdoing covered multiple jurisdictions.  Cole held that when a defendant’s misconduct is 
aimed at the entire United States, there are sufficient minimum contacts in every state.129   
 
The Cole court referred to Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Phillip Morris,130 which 
interpreted Calder as follows: “The fact that the alleged intentional wrongful act was directed at 
many states instead of just one should not have the result that [the defendant] cannot be sued 
anywhere in the United States. . . . Rather, under Calder, the fact that . . . the defendant aimed its 
alleged wrongdoing at the entire United States gives it the requisite ‘minimum contacts’ with 
each state for that alleged wrongdoing where [it] caused injury.”131   While the case law on this 
point is limited, it makes little sense to allow a defendant to avoid accountability anywhere on 
the premise that it caused multiple harms everywhere.132 
 
There is also a debate surrounding the question of whether Calder-effects jurisdiction requires 
the forum state to bear the core or “brunt” of the defendant’s misconduct.133  In Yahoo! v. La 
Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme,134 the court found the quantum of harm was not the 
appropriate measure for the sufficiency of contact in Calder-effects jurisdiction, holding that “it 
does not matter that even more harm might have been suffered in another state.”135  It makes 
little sense to limit Calder-effects jurisdiction, in terms of the “brunt” requirement, solely to the 
forum in which the most harm is felt.136   
 
Woven throughout the discussion of Calder is the notion of notice and foreseeability, both 
central to the due process argument at the core of the minimum contacts debate. Calder, like 
Asahi and Nicastro, posed the question of whether a defendant fairly can be brought before a 
court of a particular state based on the foreseeability that the defendant’s actions might cause 
                                                 
129 Id. at 816; Stephen Blecha, note __, at 895. 
130 Commonwealth v. Philip Morris, 8 Mass. L. Rep. 235, *25-26 (Mass. Super. Ct. 1998). 
131 Id. at *25-26, slip op. at 15. 
132 “[T]here can be no serious doubt after Calder v. Jones, that the state in which the victim of a tort 
suffers the injury may entertain a suit against the accused tortfeasor.” Janmark, Inc. v. Reidy, 132 F.3d 
1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1997). 
133 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789. 
134 433 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2006). 
135 Id. at 1207. 
136  Weather Underground, Inc. v. Navigation Catalyst Sys., Inc., No. 09-10756, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
30633, at *8–*9 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 24, 2011) (“The Court rejects the notion that for purposes of the 
Calder-effects test, the brunt of the injury must occur at the ‘nerve center.’ Calder does not require that 
the harm occur at the principal place of business, merely that the tortious conduct was ‘calculated to cause 
injury’. . . .”) (citation omitted); id. (“To credit Defendant’s argument, the Court has to conclude that a 
corporation can only suffer effects in one location.”); see also Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 297 (3d 
Cir. 2007);  Yahoo! v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisemitisme, 433 F.3rd 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“The “brunt” of the harm need not be suffered in the forum state. If a jurisdictionally sufficient 
amount of harm is suffered in the forum state, it does not matter that even more harm might have been 
suffered in another state.” ). 
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harm to an entity or an individual within that state.137  The Court centered on the capacity of a 
defendant to “reasonably anticipate being haled into court” as a consequence of the defendant’s 
contacts with the forum state.138   In the case of the use of stolen IP or IT by foreign 
manufacturers that export to the United States, an effect on competition and on competitors 
within any state in which their products are sold is not just foreseeable, it is inevitable.   
 
Justice Ginsberg’s dissent in Nicastro made clear that if a defendant’s misconduct is experienced 
in numerous jurisdictions, courts in any of those jurisdictions ought to be able to protect the 
citizens of those jurisdictions and find in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.139  Calder-
effects jurisdiction allows just that outcome and does not violate “traditional notions of fair play 
and substantial justice.”140  If the defendant reasonably anticipates being “haled into court, the 
due process concerns begin to dissipate.”141  
 
While Calder-effects jurisdiction holds out potential for both owners of IT and IP whose 
products are stolen as well as competitors who are affected adversely by such theft, conflicting 
views of the case render it potentially problematic as a primary source of justice for victims of IT 
and IP theft.  In the end, the jurisdictional puzzle of Asahi, compounded by the multiple opinions 
in Nicastro and the varying interpretations of Calder, make state and federal courts unreliable 
fora to resolve such claims.142  How then can the legal system protect the competitive market or 
the interests of the owners of IT and IP?  Two obvious approaches are state enforcement of 
unfair trade of unfair competition laws and a federal enforcement action or the issuances of rules 
or guidelines. 
 
V. A Beginning: The First Two (of Hopefully Many) State Unfair Competition Cases and 
the Potential for FTC Action 
 
In December 2012, Ankour Kapoor reported on the problem of IT theft in the December 2012 
ABA Antitrust Newletter.143  He approximates that “more than $60 billion . . . of IT is stolen 
each year.”144  Citing the 2011 BSA Global Software Piracy Study,145 Kapoor characterizes IT 
                                                 
137 Calder, 465 U.S. at 789–90; Sarah H. Ludington, Aiming at the Wrong Target: The ‘Audience 
Targeting’ Test for Personal Jurisdiction in Internet Defamation Cases, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 541, 546–47 
(2012).  
138 Calder, 465 U.S. at 790. 
139 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2804. 
140 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).   
141 Remick v. Manfredy, 238 F.3d 248, 253 (3d  Cir. 2001). 
142 Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery, Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts 
Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2011) (J. McIntyre is “a disaster” and the best that can be said 
is that the Court  “performed miserably”); Allan Ides, Foreword: A Critical Appraisal of the Supreme 
Court's Decision in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 341, 345 (2012) 
(McIntyre “exacerbated rather than ameliorated the doctrinal confusion” and revealed “a disappointing 
level of judicial competence”). 
143 Ankur Kapoor & Constantine Cannon, Deterring IT Theft in Manufacturing Will Spur Innovation and 
Growth, (American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law), available at 
http://www.constantinecannon.com/pdf_etc/akapoorart112012.pdf.   
144 Id. at 1. 
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theft as “rampant” and “consequential.”146  Because of the difficulties of securing jurisdiction by 
conventional means, he acknowledged the value in action by state attorneys generals or a federal 
regulatory agency.  Kapoor suggests that the theft of IT followed up with sales of products 
derived from such stolen property would be within Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act147 and would be sufficient to allow the FTC to take action against foreign entities. Thus far, 
the FTC has taken no direct action.   
 
State attorneys general, on the other hand, have begun to respond.  As Kapoor notes, in 
November 2011 eighty percent of the attorneys general in the United States signed a petition 
urging the FTC to take action designed to deter foreign manufacturers from using stolen IT,148 
and in two states, unfair trade or unfair competition cases have been initiated.   
 
a. State Unfair Trade 
 
In fall 2012, the first public state unfair trade case targeting stolen IP and IT was filed when the 
Office of the Attorney General of the State of Massachusetts initiated an action against Narong 
Seafood Company pursuant to Massachusetts General Law 93A which prohibits unfair 
competition.  Based on statements of the Attorney General, Martha Coakely,149 Narong used 
pirated or stolen IT to produce its goods in Thailand and then exported those products to the 
United States where they were sold in Massachusetts.  The Massachusetts Attorney General 
declared that the use of unlicensed software in these circumstances was an unfair method of 
competition and provided Narong with an unfair advantage over businesses operating in 
Massachusetts that pay for their software.150  Rather than fighting the claim, Narong settled, 
paying a $10,000 civil fine and agreeing to cease the use of unlicensed or stolen IT or IP in 
conjunction of the manufacture or sale of its products.  In a statement issued after the case was 
                                                                                                                                                             
145 Study, Business Software Alliance, Shadow Market: 2011 BSA Global Software Piracy Study (9th ed. 
May 2012), http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2011/downloads/study_pdf/2011_BSA_Piracy_Study-
Standard.pdf. 
146 Ankur Kapoor & Constantine Cannon, Deterring IT Theft in Manufacturing Will Spur Innovation and 
Growth, (American Bar Association, Section of Antitrust Law), available at 
http://www.constantinecannon.com/pdf_etc/akapoorart112012.pdf. 
147 Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1). 
148 Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys. Gen. to the Fed. Trade Comm’n (Nov. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/FTCA%20Enforcement%20Final.PDF. 
149 Narong Seafood Stung by Suit, BANGKOK POST BUSINESS, Oct. 23, 2012, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/economics/317953/narong-seafood-stung-by-suit; Press Release, 
Attorney General Martha Coakley, Company Fined for Using Pirated Software to Gain Unfair Advantage 
Over Massachusetts Businesses (Oct. 18, 2012), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-
updates/press-releases/2012/2012-10-18-narong-seafood-co.html; Patricia Resende, State Fines Thai 
Company for Pirated Software Use, BOSTON BUSINESS JOURNAL, Oct. 18, 2012, 
http://www.masshightech.com/stories/2012/10/15/daily46-State-fines-Thai-company-for-pirated-
software-use.html. 
150 Id. 
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settled, Attorney General Coakely stated that those “using unlicensed software should not gain 
unfair cost advantage over rivals who play by the rules.”151 
 
In January 2013 California initiated two similar cases, California v. Ningbo Beyond Home 
Textile, and California v. Pratibha Syntex.152  California Attorney General Kamala D. Harris 
warned as follows: “Companies across the globe should be on notice that they will be held 
accountable in California for stealing our intellectual property.”153  The Office of the California 
Attorney General issued a press release making clear that suits of this nature are essential to 
protect the interests of IP and IT owners and the competitive market as well as the State of 
California which has lost 400,000 jobs and $1.6 billion as a result of the IP and IT piracy.154   
 
The contentions in the Ningbo complaint are direct and powerful.  The complaint alleges that 
foreign IT and IP theft give producers “a critical short-term advantage over their American 
competitors by not paying licensing fees to software developers.”155  The actions “can stunt the 
development of . . . software” and thus flatten innovation and efficiency by U.S. technology 
providers and U.S. producers and sellers.156  Deprived of “competitive advantage[] . . . 
[companies] may . . . downsize in the United States and relocate overseas, resulting in the 
permanent loss of jobs and manufacturing in California and elsewhere.”157   
 
Consistent with the positions taken in this research, the Ningbo complaint notes that “state laws, 
federal laws, and international treaties do not address the pernicious downstream effects of such 
piracy. . . .”  Given the insufficiency of private remedies, the Ningbo case could establish a 
format for accountability.  The State asserts that the “use of pirated software to gain a 
competitive . . . can . . . be remedied by proscribing such tactics as an unfair method of 
competition under California law.”158  That potential exists in the vast majority of states.159 
 
The unfair trade and unfair competition laws of most states encompass the wrongs alleged in the 
California and Massachusetts proceedings.160  Every state has an unfair competition law, many 
                                                 
151 Press Release, Attorney General Martha Coakley, Company Fined for Using Pirated Software to Gain 
Unfair Advantage Over Massachusetts Businesses (Oct. 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2012/2012-10-18-narong-seafood-co.html. 
152 California v. Ningbo Beyond Home Textile, BC 499771, California Superior Court, filed Jan. 24, 2013 
[hereinafter Ningbo Complaint]; Pratibha Syntex, BC 499751, California Superior Court, filed Jan. 24, 
2013. 
153 Press Release, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris Files Unfair Competition Lawsuits Over Use of 
Pirated Software in Apparel Industry, Jan. 24, 2013, http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-
general-kamala-d-harris-files-unfair-competition-lawsuits-over-use.  
154 Id. at 1. 
155 Ningbo Complaint, 5-6. 
156 Ningbo Complaint at 5-6. 
157 Ningbo Complaint at 7.   
158 Ningbo Complaint at 8. 
159 Krista Correa, Comment, All Your Face Are Belong To Us: Protecting Celebrity Images in Hyper-
Realistic Video Games, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 93 (2011). 
160 Id. at 107–08 (“every state has an unfair competition statutory regime”). 
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quite similar to the statutes in Massachusetts and California.161  State unfair competition laws 
apply to stolen property and to circumstances where the competitive market is distorted and the 
pricing structure compromised by unlawful acts.  Foreign producers relying on stolen IT and IP 
and domestic sellers aware of the theft can hardly claim that the pursuit of legal recourse through 
the state comes as a surprise.   
 
Although defendants might seek to skirt liability because of the complexity and uncertainty 
generated by the in personam jurisdiction cases discussed in this work, state enforcement actions 
targeting one or more aspects of foreign supply chains are a vital and legitimate alternative 
approach to the problem.162  Asahi and Nicastro have made it difficult for private victims of IT 
and IP theft to secure a judicial remedy, but state enforcement cases have separate goals – the 
state-wide protection of fair competition, innovation, creativity, and invention – and hopefully 
will sidestep some of the problems of those cases.163  As a Nevada court noted some years ago in 
a case against the rock band Judas Priest, “[t]he exercise of jurisdiction [over a foreign entity] is 
not unreasonable, because the state has a strong interest in protecting its citizens. . . . While it is 
true that the members of Judas Priest will now be forced to defend a lawsuit in a country distant 
from their own, it is more equitable to place such a burden on them, and not the plaintiffs, 
because the band members consciously and deliberately chose to develop a world-wide 
market.”164   
 
It hardly seems controversial to recognize that states have an interest in protecting their own 
citizens. In Le Manufacture Francaise Des Pneumatiques Michelin v. Dist. Court In & for 
Jefferson County,165 the court recognized the importance of “plaintiffs' interest in obtaining 
convenient and effective relief. . . . [T]he plaintiffs would be hard pressed to pursue this litigation 
in France. In addition, this state has an interest in providing a forum to its citizens injured by the 
alleged tortious conduct of nonresidents.”  In State v. NV Sumatra Tobacco Trading, Co.,166 the 
court found”[t]he exercise of jurisdiction over [defendant] Sumatra . . . reasonable and fair.  
While it may be inconvenient for Sumatra to travel to the United States to defend the action 
against it, the State's interest in exercising jurisdiction outweighs any such inconvenience.”  
Since the Massachusetts and California cases are among the first instances of state enforcement 
of unfair trade or unfair competition statutes in IT and IP theft cases, it remains to be seen 
                                                 
161 E.g. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS, §§ 37-24-1 et. seq.; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-104-(Consumerprotection 
Act of 1977); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.41 et. seq.; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 13.5a-103, 13.5-17, 
13.11-4, et.seq.; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2453; VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-196, et. seq.; WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN.  § 19.86.010 et. seq.; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46a-6-101 et. seq.; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.20; WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 40-12-105.  
162 Some of the materials that follow are based on and draw from my earlier article, Andrew Popper, 
Beneficiaries of Misconduct: A Direct Approach to IT Theft, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 27 (2013).  
163 Austen L. Parrish, Reclaiming International Law From Extraterritoriality, 93 MINN. L. REV. 815, 848-
521(2009) (“U.S. domestic laws, applied extraterritorially, are now routinely used to influence 
international policy.”); Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in Copyright 
Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 587, 592-96 (1997). 
164 Judas Priest v. Second Judicial Dist. Court of State of Nev., 760 P.2d 137, 138 (Second Judicial Dist. 
Ct. Nev. 1988).   
165 620 P.2d 1040, 1043 (Colo. 1980) (emphasis added). 
166 666 S.E.2d 218, 219 (S.C. 2008). 
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whether the broad interests of a state, as a complainant, will be accorded a more expansive 
reading of the in personam cases jurisprudence discussed in the paper. 
Although foreign producers and sellers who use stolen IT in their business operations might find 
a safe haven in the jurisprudential chaos that comes in the wake of the Nicastro decision, they 
should be answerable for their misconduct – and the state unfair trade and unfair competition 
laws can serve that function.  For example, North Carolina declares unlawful “[u]nfair methods 
of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce.”167  Regular use of stolen goods to gain an unfair competitive advantage over those 
who abide by the law, obviously falls within the reach of that provision.  Iowa and Missouri both 
prohibit “unfair practices”168 with a goal of preserving and protecting the competitive market. 169  
These laws hold out the potential of deterring170 misconduct throughout the supply chain, even if 
they may not uniformly provide a meaningful private remedy.171  That said, simple fairness 
suggests that “[o]ne who has used his intellectual, physical, or financial powers to create a 
commercial product should be afforded judicial relief from a competitor who seeks to ‘reap what 
he has not sown’.”172  By the public implementation and enforcement of these statutes, the gain 
for private victims,173 at a minimum, is the benefit, downstream, of a vibrant competitive market 
environment.174  Some states conceive of these claims broadly (“all statutory and non-statutory 
causes of action arising out of business conduct which is contrary to honest practice in industrial 
or commercial matters. . .”175) while others do not.176  One thing is clear: thus far, the potential 
                                                 
167 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1(a) (2010).   
168 IOWA CODE § 714.16(2)(a) (West 2010); MO. REV. STAT. § 407.020(1) (Supp. 2008) (focused on 
fraud and misrepresentation).  
169 Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 982 F.2d 350 (9th Cir. 1992). 
170 Andrew Popper, In Defense of Deterrence, 87 ALBANY L. REV. 181, 202 (2011) (“To claim that 
punishment has no effect on other market participants is to deny our collective experience. . . .  Money 
approximates loss and covers expenses.  It can alter financial possibilities and provide remedial potential.  
Justice requires more: the avoidance of similar harms, or deterrence.”).  
171 Texas does have a right of private direct action,  TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b), (d) 
(Vernon 2007); Michael Flynn and Karen Slater, All We Are Saying Is Give Business a Chance: The 
Application of State UDAP Statutes to Business-to-Business Transactions, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
81, n. 45 (2003) (discuss private right of action and noting that the following states provide the 
opportunity to pursue an individual claim: Alaska Stat. 45.50.531(a) (Michie 2001); Ark. Code Ann. 4-
88-113(f) (Michie 2002); Colo. Rev. Stat. 6-1-113(1)(a)-(c) (2002); Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, 2533(a) (2002); 
Ga. Code Ann. 10-1-373(a) (2002); 815 Ill. Comp. Stat. 505/10a(a) (2002); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
51:1409(A) (West 2002); Md. Code Ann., Comm. Law I 13-408(a) (2002); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. 
445.911 (West 2002); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. 358-A:10(I) (2002); N.Y. Gen. Bus. 349(h) (Consol. 2002); 
N.J. Stat. Ann. 56:8-2.12 (West 2002); S.D. Codified Laws 37-24-31 (Michie 2002); Tenn. Code Ann. 
47-18-109(a)(1) (2002); Va. Code Ann. 59.1-204(A) (Michie 2002). 
172 Rudolf Callmann, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair 
Competition, 55 HARV. L. REV. 595, 612 (1942).  
173 See, e.g., Kenney v. Hanger Prosthetics & Orthotics, Inc., 269 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007).  
174 Miguel Deutch, Unfair Competition and the “Misappropriation Doctrine”  A Renewed Analysis, 48 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 503, 545 (2004) (evoking the free rider problem). 
175 Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 14 (5th Cir. 1974); see also 
Rehabilitation Specialists, Inc. v. Koering, 404 N.W.2d 301, 305–06 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987). 
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for private claims related to IT and IP theft based on current case law, outside of cases brought 
by state attorneys general, has not substantially slowed down the rate of foreign piracy.177  The 
significant cost of investigation at home and abroad, litigation costs, and the complexities 
associated with enforcement of judgments place this option beyond the reach of most victims.  In 
contrast, public unfair trade cases can address a whole range of misconduct, harness the 
resources of a state attorney general, and do not require a showing of a personal harm.   
 
Though the meaning of unfair competition varies,178 theft of IT and IP is clearly illegal in any 
conception of the term.179  Moreover, once a case is properly before a court in an unfair trade 
case, there is a good argument that the power exists to secure a remedy that includes non-U.S. 
defendants,180 and also an argument that remedies can be confined to property or interests in the 
forum state only.181   
 
b. The Federal Trade Commission 
 
Another approach for dealing with stolen IP or IT and its effects on U.S. commerce would be for 
the FTC to direct its energy to this profoundly unfair method of competition pursuant to Section 
5 of the FTC Act that condemns “unfair methods of competition” and “unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices.”182  The power of this legislation allows the FTC to “consider[] public values beyond 
simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.”183  Those 
values certainly include condemning as unfair theft of IT and IP, whether by foreign or domestic 
                                                                                                                                                             
176 Constance A. Anastopoulo, Bad Faith: Building a House of Straw, Sticks, or Bricks, 42 U. MEM, L. 
REV. 687, 690 (2012) (“most states do not permit a private right of action under their [unfair competition 
or unfair trade] statutes”). 
177 C. Owen Paepke, An Economic Interpretation of the Misappropriation Doctrine: Common Law 
Protection for Investments in Innovation, 2 HIGH TECH. L.J. 55, 63 (1987); Courtney W. Franks, 
Comment, Analyzing the Urge to Merge: Conversion of Intangible Property and the Merger Doctrine in 
the Wake of Kremen v. Cohen, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 489, 522 (2005).  
178 See, e.g., United Labs., Inc. v. Kuykendall, 403 S.E.2d 104, 109 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (“No precise 
definition of ‘unfair methods of competition’ . . . exists. . . . ‘Rather, the fair or unfair nature of particular 
conduct is to be judged . . . against the background of actual human experience and by determining its 
intended and actual effects upon others.’”  (quoting McDonald v. Scarboro, 370 S.E.2d 680, 684 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1988)). 
179 See State ex rel. Miller v. Cutty’s Des Moines Camping Club, Inc., 694 N.W.2d 518, 526 (Iowa 2005) 
(“What is an ‘unfair practice’?  On its face the term is dizzying in its generality. . . .  [C]ourts have 
determined statutes that prohibit ‘unfair practices’ are designed to infuse flexible equitable principles into 
consumer protection law so that it may respond to the myriad of unscrupulous business practices modern 
consumers face.”). 
180 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 53 (1971) (“A state has power to exercise 
judicial jurisdiction to order a person, who is subject to its judicial jurisdiction, to do an act, or to refrain 
from doing an act, in another state.”).    
181 Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 48, cmt. c (1995) (“Although a court may have 
jurisdiction to grant broader relief, an injunction protecting the right of publicity should ordinarily be 
limited to conduct in jurisdictions that provide protection comparable to the forum state.”).  
182 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006). 
183 See FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (“[T]he Federal Trade Commission . . . 
considers public values beyond simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the 
antitrust laws.”). 
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entities.  Moreover, the power of the FTC extends beyond domestic borders184 if the foreign 
action has “a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on U.S. markets.185  
 
The FTC could also conduct a rulemaking designed to create standards for supply chain review 
by domestic sellers or, without going to the time and expense of a rulemaking, issue guidelines 
that establish criteria to make clear the obligation of domestic importers and sellers to determine 
if foreign providers are relying on stolen IP or IT.186   
 
The FTC could also initiate enforcement actions, targeting domestic sellers, importers, or foreign 
entities that sell products manufactured by companies that use stolen IT or IP in their business 
operations.187  Such enforcement would be particularly justified with respect to manufacturers 
located in jurisdictions in which meaningful remedies for IT theft in the local courts are difficult 
to obtain.   
 
In order to carry out their legislative mandate, federal agencies must, from time to time, reach 
beyond the territorial United States in order to protect domestic interests and ensure 
accountability. A recent SEC action reflects this approach and addresses the in personam 
jurisdiction question as follows: “Although it might not be convenient for Defendants to defend 
this action in the United States, Defendants have not made a particular showing that the burden 
on them would be “severe” or “gravely difficult.” . . .  [I]f the SEC could not enforce the FCPA 
against Defendants in federal courts in the United States, Defendants could potentially evade 
liability altogether.”188  To turn a blind eye to practices that cost U.S. entities hundreds of 
billions of dollars each year borders on abdication.  At a bare minimum, the issuance of “best 
practices” standards or guidelines – both of which can be done at a low cost and with a minimum 
of process, would be a step in the right direction and would send a powerful message.   
 
A substantial report on the problem of IT and IP theft was recently released by the White 
House.189  It was developed with the input of the following agencies: the Departments of 
Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, State, and the 
Treasury, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the U.S. Copyright Office.190  Notably, the FTC 
was not involved.  The report urges the establishment of mechanisms to secure supply chains and 
recites the accomplishment of various domestic and transnational entities to address the 
                                                 
184 Andrew Serwin, The Federal Trade Commission and Privacy: Defining Enforcement and Encouraging 
the Adoption of Best Practices, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 809, 821 (2011). 
185 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A) (2006). 
186 Serge Mezhburd, The Unintelligible Standard: Rethinking the Mandate of the FTC from a 
Nondelegation Perspective, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AMM L. 361, 366-72 (2000) (explaining the history of 
FTC rulemaking power). 
187 Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. 41-58 (2000) (provides the Commission power to secure 
injunctive relief against those who are engaged in unfair or deceptive act, though nothing in the Act 
allows for individual claim by those who are the victims of the misconduct).  
188 S.E.C. v. Straub, --- F.Supp.2d ---- (2013) 2013 WL 466600 S.D. New York, No. 11 Civ. 9645(RJS) 
Feb. 8, 2013; see generally SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir.1990).   
189 2011 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT COORDINATOR, ANNUAL REPORT 
ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT (U.S.I.P. Report) 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report_mar2012.pdf 
190 2011 U.S.I.P. Report at 7.  
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problem.191  Based on this report, the commitment of federal resources seems substantial – and 
an invitation for the FTC to engage in the effort. 
 
VI. Concluding Perspectives 
 
Professor Taylor Simpson-Wood recently examined the problems with in personam jurisdiction 
generated by both the Nicastro case (discussed earlier) and its companion, Goodyear Dunlop 
Tires Operation v Brown.192  After noting the failure of the Court to craft meaningful guidance to 
deal with international defendants in product liability cases, Professor Simpson-Wood noted that 
one can only hope that in the future the Court will adopt “a more expansive view of general 
jurisdiction.”193  She suggests that stream of distribution or stream of commerce theories should 
suffice “sans the minimum contact analysis.”194  
 
Like Nicastro, Goodyear195 did nothing to simplify the problem of dealing with foreign entities 
engaged in misconduct that has a pernicious effect and negative consequences for the U.S. 
economy.  If anything, it rendered more difficult the task of plaintiffs who are victims of foreign 
IT or IP theft by “clarifying that the overly complicated stream of commerce theory of personal 
jurisdiction does not apply to general in personam jurisdiction analysis.”196  Even when 
confronting egregious misconduct, including the charge of overt violation of human rights, the 
                                                 
191 2011 U.S.I.P. Report at 18-19:  
“Tracking and Reporting of Enforcement Activities: DHS seizure . . .for counterfeit pharmaceuticals rose 
nearly 200 percent to 1,239. The overall number of DHS IPR seizures rose 24 percent to 24,792. 
Counterfeit and pirated goods seized via express carrier services increased by 16 percent over FY 2010 
and 65 percent over FY 2009. Counterfeit consumer safety and critical technology merchandise seizures 
rose 44 percent in FY 2011 to more than $60 million. FBI initiated 235 IPR investigations, made 93 
arrests, secured 79 indictments, and obtained 79 convictions. . . . DOJ saw sentences resulting from its 
prosecutions of IPR crimes increase in severity, with a doubling in the number of sentences of 60+ 
months and a tripling of sentences of 37-60 months. . . . Nine partner agencies including criminal 
investigative agencies from the DOD and NASA as well as the FBI, ICE HSI, and CBP launched 
Operation Chain Reaction.  This is a coordinated and comprehensive initiative targeted to curtailing the 
flow of counterfeit items into the U S Government supply chain. CBP led a year-long initiative within the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) targeting counterfeit pharmaceuticals . . . in coordination 
with INTERPOL, the World Customs Organization (WCO), and law enforcement in 81 countries. . . .”  
192 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operation v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011); Taylor Simpson-Wood, In 
the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez!Oyez!Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid Approach to Personal 
Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR L.REV.113, 156 (2012). 
193 Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez!Oyez!Oyez! A Call for a Hybrid 
Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR 
L.REV.113, 156 (2012).  
194 Id. 
195 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operation, at 2851 et. seq. (In Goodyear, plaintiff was killed in a bus accident 
in France.  The plaintiff’s parents alleged that the accident was the result of a defect in tires produced by 
defendant Goodyear in North Carolina and then sold primarily for use outside the U.S.  The tires were not 
sold in North Carolina.  The court found that for corporate liability in cases of this nature “the paradigm” 
for the “exercise of general jurisdiction” and the focus is on the jurisdiction “the corporation . . .  fairly 
regard[s] as at home.”). 
196 S. Wilson Quick, Comment, Staying Afloat in the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear, McIntyre, and the 
Ship of Personal Jurisdiction, 37 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 547, (2012).  
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Court has seemed unwilling to declare the U.S. courts a friendly forum when the defendant is 
foreign.197   
 
Another commentator, Professor Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, is likewise critical of the Court’s 
failure to provide guidance on legal standards or relief to those who are victims of misconduct by 
foreign entities.198  Rhodes characterizes the decisions of the court in Nicastro and Goodyear as 
“embracing a rigid formalism” and making use of a “fictional basis” for jurisdictional limitations 
that frustrate the legitimate interests of those entitled to relief in the United States. Rhodes notes 
that the court has long rejected the notion of “doing business” as a basis for jurisdiction,199 
perhaps necessitating legislative action to address the deeply problematic uncertainties in the 
field.200   
 
A comment in the Fordham Law Review recently observed: “[I]n a global economy, where a 
manufacturer produces machines hoping to sell them in as many places as possible, it is not 
unfair to subject that manufacturer to suit in a place where it hopes, but does not necessarily 
anticipate, to do business.”201  The logic and fairness behind this position is clear. As one court 
noted: “[I]n this age of WTO and GATT one can expect further globalization of commerce, and 
it is only reasonable that companies that distribute allegedly defective products through regional 
distributors in this country. . . anticipate being haled into court by plaintiffs in their home 
states.”202  Unfortunately, that reasoning does not appear in Asahi, Nicastro, or Goodyear.  
 
Hope for a viable and reliable theory for victims of IT and TP theft after Nicastro and Goodyear 
seems faint at best.  Dean and Professor Wendy Collins Perdue recently wrote about both cases, 
finding the Court sharply divided on critical jurisdictional questions.203  Looking at the opinions 
of Justice Kennedy and Justice Ginsberg in Nicastro, Dean Purdue characterizes the assertions in 
both opinions regarding jurisdiction to be simply incorrect.  She argues that Justice Kennedy’s 
position in Nicastro “suggests that Kennedy believes that defendants have a liberty interest in not 
being subject to the governmental authority of the state with which they have not affirmatively 
affiliated themselves.”204  She goes on to note that “Kennedy apparently believes that states have 
no power or authority separate than what is conferred by the defendant.”205  This position takes 
“party autonomy” to a new and troubling level.  While courts have long recognized that parties 
                                                 
197 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S.Ct. 472 (U.S. 2011) (limiting the application of the Alien 
Tort Claims Act to individuals, giving corporations a free ride). 
198 Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, 19th Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a 21st Century World, 
64 FLORIDA L. REV. 387 (2012).   
199 Id at 430 (citing McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (“In a continuing process of 
evolution this Court accepted and then abandoned ‘consent,’ ‘doing business,’ and ‘presence’ as the 
standard for measuring the extent of state judicial power over such corporations.”). 
200 Rhodes at 435.  
201 In Peter Bryce, Whither Fairness? In search of jurisdictional test after J Macintyre Machinery v 
Nicastro, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 2975, 3006 (2012) (citations omitted). 
202 Jones & Pointe v. Boto, 498 F. Supp. 2d 822, 829 (E.D. Pa. 2007) citing Barone v. Rich Brothers 
Fireworks, 25 F.3d 610, 615 (8th Cir. 1994). 
203 Wendy Perdue Collins, What’s  Sovereignty Got To Do With It? Due Process, Personal Jurisdiction, 
and the Supreme Court, 63 SOUTH CAROLINA L. REV. 729 (2012). 
204 Id. at 741. 
205 Id. 
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may agree to apply the law of a particular state when entering in to a contract, the options do not 
include selecting no law, no state, and no accountability.206 
  
It is hard to see another way to read cases like Nicastro, leaving most victims of overt IT and IP 
theft without a clear path to secure justice in the courts, outside the reading of Calder suggested 
earlier.  Public enforcement or regulatory action at the state or federal level can sanction those 
engaged in this misconduct and send a clear message regarding the public will to address the 
problem.     
 
Assuming the Supreme Court is disinclined to back away from Nicastro, unwilling to switch 
gears and adopt Justice Brennan’s stream of commerce approach, and unlikely to revisit Calder 
clarifying the unresolved aiming issues, one remaining option for improving the possibility of 
private relief is federal legislation that enables injured parties better access to U.S. courts.  Thus 
far, that approach has not fared well in Congress.207  In my view, a legislative solution is fair, 
constitutional, and necessary.208   
 
Whether such legislation has a political future is another question.  In 2010, the last time a bill 
was submitted to address these problems, it died a quiet death without ever coming to the floor of 
the House.209  However, the idea is solid and responds to Justice O’Connor’s invitation in Asahi: 
“Congress could, consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, authorize 
federal court personal jurisdiction over alien defendants based on the aggregate of national 
                                                 
206 M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1972).  Party autonomy is not without its 
critics, See, William J. Woodward, Jr., Constraining Opt-Outs: Shielding Local Law and Those It 
Protects from Adhesive Choice of Law Clauses, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 9, 33-34 (2006) and compare with 
Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise, 67 WASH. 
L. REV. 55, 66 (1992) (reviewing the “strong sense of the importance of party autonomy” evident in 
Supreme Court cases). 
207 THE FOREIGN MANUFACTURERS LEGAL ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 2010, H.R. 4678, 111th Cong. 
(2010) (as reported by H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce) provided a straightforward legislative 
solution but was not passed. 
208 Before the Committee on Energy and Commerce, United States House of Representatives, 111th 
Congress, Second Session, June 16, 2010, H.R. 4678, The Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability 
Act http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100616/Popper.Testimony.06.16.2010.pdf 
(The author testified that this was “a strong bill that is constitutionally sound, beneficial to consumers, 
beneficial to U.S. businesses, and consistent with the domestic laws and practices of many of our major 
trading partners.  It levels the civil liability landscape, stripping foreign manufacturers of an unfair 
advantage.  It addresses a powerful but understandable loophole in our legal system, facilitating access to 
the courts by injured consumers.  By making possible litigation against those who place into the stream of 
commerce dangerous, defective, and even deadly goods, the bill triggers corrective justice incentive 
mechanisms of the tort system.  When you create the realistic possibility for liability, you activate 
incentives to make safer and more efficient products.”).   
209 Hearing on H.R. 4678, the “Foreign Manufacturers Legal Accountability Act,” and H.R. 5156, the 
“Clean Energy Technology Manufacturing and Export Assistance Act,” Subcommittee on Commerce, 
Trade and Consumer Protection (June 16, 2010) 
http://democrats.energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?q=hearing/hearing-on-hr-4678-the-foreign-
manufacturers-legal-accountability-act-and-hr-5156-the-clean- 
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contacts, rather than on the contacts between the defendant and the State in which the federal 
court sits.”210  
 
In the absence of federal legislation, protection of basic property rights compel state unfair trade 
enforcement along the lines of the Massachusetts and California proceedings discussed in this 
work or FTC action.  Those avenues must be pursued and widened.  Governmental initiatives of 
this type will stimulate innovation, creativity, invention, and produce incentives for efficiency.  
They will have a stabilizing effect on the competitive market.  Finally, they can help avoid the 
loss of another trillion dollars in the next decade.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
210 Asahi, 480 U.S. at 113.   
